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The paper investigates what kind of economic system would favor research and
deployment of Solar Radiation Management (SRM), especially sulfur based stratospheric
aerosol injection (SAI). The political economy argument combines moral, economic,
and political assumptions in order to reach a credible “fitting”-judgement. After
presenting some normative ideas on climate ethics, the concept of political economy
(PE) is explained. Variants of capitalism are distinguished. These considerations are
substantiated by investigating the relation between the U.S. economic system and recent
support for SRM, especially for SAI. The paper concludes that the U.S. economic
system has strong affinities to SRM supported by an emerging agency network that
tries to establish a pro-SRM narrative and launch SAI research initiatives. There is recent
evidence that SRM has found support from policy makers. To supporters of “green”
variants of capitalism, the main claims of the article provide reasons against SAI-research.
The article finishes with some remarks why SAI-research should be conditional.
Keywords: climate ethics, political economy, solar radiation management, stratospheric aerosol injection,
capitalism, agency networks, U.S.
INTRODUCTION: OUTLOOK ON STRUCTURE AND CONTENT OF
THE ARGUMENT
The recent discourse on the ethical aspects of solar radiation management (SRM), especially
regarding the possible injection of sulfur-based aerosols (SAI) into the stratosphere, has resulted
in a comprehensive mapping of pro- and contra-arguments which is open for further detailed
analysis and discourse (see contributions in Rickels et al., 2011; Preston, 2012, 2016; Morrow and
Svoboda, 2016; Svoboda, 2016). SAI belongs to the small set of SRMoptions that have a fast effect on
global temperatures (Zhang et al., 2015). Compared to cloud brightening and space-based options
to dim sunlight, SAI seems the most feasible SRM-technology. SAI is at the core of SRM. If so, it
seems appropriate to speak of “SRM/SAI”-discourse. On the pro side of the SRM/SAI discourse,
we find “lesser-evil” arguments, “buying-time” arguments, and “arming-the-future” arguments. On
the contra side of this map, we find “hazard” arguments of different kinds, “moral-corruption”
arguments and “hubris” arguments. Crucial for discourse is the question whether a trade-off1
between SAI and mitigation of GHG is likely (Hale, 2012; Lin, 2013; Morrow, 2014; Baatz, 2016).
In this article, I wish to provide an outlook on how an argument on the political economy (PE)
of SAI might be conceived which is to be located on the contra side of discourse. As we will see
throughout this article, such arguments are, on the surface, quite simplistic arguments because
they point to economic interests; yet, on reflection, they raise fundamental ethical, political, and
economic problems.
1The “trade-off” problem has been often dubbed “moral-hazard-problem”. Hale (2012) has distinguished at least nine variants
of moral-hazard arguments against climate engineering. I follow Baatz’s terminology.
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Arguments from moral corruption ask what kind of people
would go for SRM/SAI (Gardiner, 2012). Such virtue-ethical
argument refers to individual moral character traits. PE
arguments ask similar but distinct questions: Are there affinities
between economic structures and technologies? Does a specific
technology “fit” into a given economic structure? And, more
specifically, what kind of economic systems would favor research,
development and deployment (RDD) of SRM and SAI? How
would such RDD-strategies affect different economic systems
and branches for better or worse? Such PE arguments are
not prominent in fields of applied ethics because they rest on
many contested premises and they always come close to heated
political debates. If philosophical ethics presupposes the ideals
of moral purity and epistemological parsimony, PE arguments
can’t take off. Under such ideals, however, onemay overlook “real
world” motives. Ethical scrutiny itself, then, may overlook rough
forces, (hidden) agendas, (vested) interests, and narrow-minded
motives.
The PE argument starts from the following consideration:
Imagine that a technological innovation combats negative
external effects of a given economic system onto the environment
without addressing the root causes. Suppose that without
technological innovations there would be an increasing pressure
to specific economic systems to undergo substantial reforms
in crucial branches and business models. Imagine further, that
a specific technological innovation fits well into the overall
performance (“culture”) of a specific economic system and
into the mindsets of ruling academic, economic, and political
elites. Thus, such innovation is promising for such elites
because it combats external effects in a way that permits
the economic system to continue without deep reforms. The
technological innovation is convenient or even attractive to the
system’s overall performance (“business as usual”). This “fitting”-
relation explains why such innovation may look innovative
from a technological perspective, while it looks conservative
and protective from a PE perspective. Note, that PE judgments
on “fitting” are judgements of prudence. If one argues that
“a fits to b” one can, at its best, claim degrees of plausibility.
As we know since Aristotle, a logical proof is out of reach
in such cases. In specific instances, such presumptive “fitting”-
relation can be analyzed from two angles. One can analyze,
first, how technological innovations might give support to the
continuity and viability of the economic system, but one can
also perform social research how technological options find
support by agency networks within the economic system. The
first analysis is political economy proper, while the second is
sociological discourse and network analysis (Sikka, 2012, 2013).
Both types of analysis are given in section A Critical Look at the
U.S. and Agency Networks and Narratives in the U.S.
Such presumptive “fitting”-relation allows for the following
positions: A person may, first, support the economic system for
the overall prosperity it brings about. She sees technologies
as value-neutral means to reduce external effects. This
assumption implies that promising technological options
should be researched without delay. Such research should be
unconditional. This person would not be troubled by a “fitting”-
relation. Let us dub this position “enthusiastic.” A person may,
second, support the economic system but recognize that the
technology at stake entails risks, presumptive externalities,
uncertainties, and (moral) hazards. This person must weigh the
benefits of an unreformed economic system with both a) the
costs of reforms and b) the overall hazards of the technology.
Let us dub this position “cautious.” This “cautious” position
can slip into a “tragic” position, if the costs of substantial
reforms are perceived as highly burdensome to companies
and consumers. If such reforms are perceived to be unfeasible,
technology must substitute reforms2. Another person may, third,
dislike the economic system for reasons that are independent
from specific technologies. She may reject high inequality,
negative environmental impacts, and views technologies—with
all its hazards—as devices (assets) in a portfolio of means to
make the economic system run further on. Let us dub this
position “adverse.” Finally, a person rejects the economic system
for reasons that are independent from technologies and rejects
technologies for reasons that are independent from the economic
system. To her, the fitting connects two evils supporting each
other. Let us dub this position “rejective”3. The article wishes to
specify this abstract scheme of thought.
The article is structured as follows: Next section presents
some normative ideas on climate ethics (section On Climate
Ethics 2). In the subsequent section, the concept of political
economy is explained and different variants of capitalism are
introduced (section Variants of Capitalism and Investment
Strategies). Section A Critical Look at the U.S. substantiates
the abstract conjunctive relation between economic systems and
technological innovation with the relation between SAI as an
instance of technology and the U.S. as an instance of a specific
variant of capitalism. Section Agency Networks and Narratives in
the U.S. looks at agency networks within the U.S. supporting this
conjunction either enthusiastically or cautiously. Section Agency
Networks and Narratives in the U.S. also comments on recent
developments within U.S. policies and reflects them from an
EU-perspective. Section Conclusion and Outlook concludes and
argues for conditionality of SAI-field-testing.
ON CLIMATE ETHICS
Strategies to Combat Impacts of Climate
Change
PE arguments are embedded in the overall discourse of how
to address climate change and its impacts. Given the robust
picture of a warming world due to still rising anthropogenic
GHG-emissions, there are strong economic4, moral, and political
2Note that enthusiastic and cautious person interpret the “&” in “R&D” differently.
While enthusiasts read it as a ‘first research, then deployment’ relation, cautious
persons claim that there should be no automatism between research and
development.
3This position has been adopted by Gunderson et al. (2018) relying on Critical
Theory, especially on the writings of Herbert Marcuse.
4Crucial for determining the efficient (“optimal”) climate pathway is the rate of
discount and other value-lade assumptions in economic models. If the rate of
discount is set close to zero, if the additional utility of future commodities is set low,
and if the infinite-living-agent-model is replaced by an overlapping-generation-
model, then there are even stronger economic reasons to combat the impacts of
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reasons to combat the many impacts of climate change without
further delay. There are only four strategies to do so which, of
course, might be combined to form specific political-economic
pathways:
1. Aggressive and far-reaching mitigation (abatement) of GHG-
emissions
2. Adaptation to a warming climate
3. Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) on a global scale5
4. SRM, especially SAI.
Basic strategies are not exclusive, but can be combined. This
set or portfolio of strategies (see Figure 1) has to be arranged
in a way that gives priority to specific options. Morrow (2014)
has argued that political decisions on the portfolio mix are
likely to be influenced by biases and failures of different kind.
Even if one speculates on perfectly balanced (“ideal”, “optimal”)
combinations, one has to prioritize6. Any priority must rely
on some betterness-relation. All judgments on priorities should
suppose assumptions on how single strategies influence each
other in a dynamic international political field over time. For
instance, do prospects for SAI undermine mitigation efforts
(“trade-off-hypothesis”), or is SAI, as the cautious position
(section Introduction: Outlook on Structure and Content of the
Argument) might suggest, nothing but a short-term “add on”
within a long process of curbing global emissions? Might SAI
be just a prudent strategy to buy time? The trade-off-hypothesis
(“moral hazard”) is crucial for the PE argument. It assumes that
SAI-research may undermine mitigation efforts. If one goes for
SAI and aggressive and far-reaching mitigation will not take
place, SAI is a route of no return7. Meanwhile, there is some
climate change by means of mitigation. The problem of discounting is crucial in
Stern (2007).
5The article addresses the political economy of SRM, especially SAI. To what extent
the results hold true for certain CDR technologies is to be addressed in future work.
6It is beyond the scope of this article to reflect upon the many economic studies on
an “optimal” portfolio.
7In consequence, future generations may face the so called “termination problem.”
For an ethical analysis, see Ott (2012a).
evidence that this trade-off hypothesis between mitigation and
SAI is likely (Lin, 2013; Baatz, 2016). As Muraca and Neuber
(2017) point out this is highly likely in growth-based economies.
The most promising pro-SAI arguments are the “arming-the-
future”-argument, the “emergency”-argument and the “buying-
time”-argument. The “arming-the-future-argument” has been
critically reflected by Gardiner (2010). The “emergency”-
argument has been refused by Sillmann et al. (2015). The
“buying-time”-argument has been analyzed in detail by Neuber
(2017), showing that it is uncertain whether SAI will be phased
out after some short period of “peak shaving.” The “buying-
time”-argument rest on the assumption that mitigation will be
intensified in this “peak-shaving”-strategy. The “buying-time”-
argument rejects the idea that SAI could offset emissions and
conceives SAI as a limited add-on within a long-term mitigation
process. From the moral point of view, “buying-time”/”peak-
shaving”-strategies look desirable if they are performed with the
intention to protect poor people in the Global South against
the impacts of climate change. The “buying-time”-argument
requires starting research on SAI immediately, including small-
scale field experiments that may prepare for large-scale field tests.
What looks attractive from the moral point of view, might be
entrenched in self-interested politics. AsHorton andKeith (2016)
argue, SAI deployment is legitimate even if it will be undertaken
out of national self-interest as far as its global side effects benefit
the poor. This, however, ignites the question of trustworthiness:
Why should one believe that a high-emission state that launches
SAI out of self-interest might be willing to curb emissions
aggressively and phase out SAI right in time. The problem of
trustworthiness refers to the problem of conditionality (section
Conclusion and Outlook).
Let’s take a closer look at SAI. From a technological
perspective, SAI is a tempting option for advanced industrial
systems since its deployment requires “big” scientific RDD,
data mining, chemistry, aircraft, monitoring, securitization,
governance schemes, and the like. This is true also for all
patents on such technologies (Chavez, 2014). SAI would spur
new business models. There would be “winners” if priority would
FIGURE 1 | Trapeze of strategies to respond to anthropogenic climate change.
Frontiers in Environmental Science | www.frontiersin.org 3 June 2018 | Volume 6 | Article 43
Ott Political Economy of SRM/SAI
be given to SAI instead of aggressive mitigation. Investing in
large SAI-infrastructure would be profitable to some branches,
including science.
SAI is often said to be feasible at low deployment costs.
Ferraro (2013, p 5) calculates the annual costs for delivering
five Tg of aerosol to an altitude of 20–30 km using aircraft in
the range between two and eight billion dollars. Keith (2000)
argues that the costs of SAI-deployment are “trivial” compared
to costs of mitigation. Recent estimates, however, pointing to
analogies to other large-scale project arguing that costs are often
widely underrated (Reynolds et al., 2016) and increase largely as
the project proceeds and has passed its “points of no return.”
Klepper and Rickels (2012) and Moriyama et al. (2016) have
casted serious doubts on the economic reliability of the cost
estimates. Nevertheless, there is still widespread agreement in
conventional economics that efficiency speaks in favor of SAI
over aggressive mitigation.
From a PE perspective, however, conventional cost-benefit-
analysis (CBA) should be regarded as being part of the problem.
There are three reasons for this: First, only deployment costs
of SAI are compared to opportunity costs of mitigation.
Other costs are often neglected. In standard versions of CBA
there are, second, many value-judgments entailed by specific
rates of discount, the elasticity of substitution, the value of
a statistical life, the infinite-living-agent-models, the Kaldor-
Hicks-compensation-test, the non-satiation axiom, the marginal
value of future units of consumption and the like. It has been
argued often that climate policies should not rely on CBA
which are based on such morally contested assumptions (see
e.g., Randall, 2002; Schröder et al., 2002; Hampicke, 2011).
Most opportunity costs of mitigation are, third, nothing but
delays of GDP-growth. Thus, there is a trade-off between delay
in GDP growth and the risks of SAI. Proponents of SAI are
often supporters of GDP growth (Sikka, 2012; Muraca and
Neuber, 2017). Through a PE perspective, all three assumptions
underlying CBA should be seen with a critical eye.
Contraction and Convergence
It seems fair to readers to make explicit the climate ethical stance
of the author (overview Ott, 2011). Together with Christian
Baatz, I have argued elsewhere that mitigation of GHG deserves
priority since it addresses the root cause of the problem (Baatz
and Ott, 2016)8. We argue that addressing the root cause of
climate change much better serves the interests of posterity than
curing the symptoms with high-risk strategies under a trade-
off against mitigation. There is a moral obligation to avoid
possible future dilemmas between either continuing SAI even
at highly negative consequences or stopping SAI and causing
rapid climate change in an unmitigated world (Ott, 2012a).
This “termination-shock”-argument remains of relevance even
with respect to the (political) uncertainties of a “buying-time”-
strategy. As Reynolds et al. (2016) argue, SAI can’t be stopped
8The “root cause” assumption allows for further claims on “ultimate” causes,
as population growth, energy demand etc. The “root cause” assumptions only
establishes a causal nexus between GHG emissions and climate change. Here, I
follow Huttunen et al. (2015, p. 22).
suddenly, but must be phased out “over a long period of time.”
Which governance schemes may insure humanity against a
termination shock? What, if some nations wish to continue SAI
while others would like to phase it out? What, if a large volcano
eruption happens while SAI is under full deployment? Would
such situation of additional cooling be manageable? Thus, an
outlook of presumptive future dilemmas makes sense even under
a “peak-shaving”-scenario.
Moreover, I support “Contraction and Convergence” (C&C)
as a general strategic concept (Meyer, 2000; see also Baatz and
Ott, 2017 for a detailed analysis) which, however, must be
augmented by adaptation strategies. Contraction should keep
GHG-concentrations with high probability within a tolerable
limit. This tolerable window should be specified by the “well
below 2◦C”-target compared to preindustrial global mean
temperature. Such contraction implies scarcity of the remaining
cumulative global emission budget (<1.000 Gt). An egalitarian
per-capita criterion can be defended as a non-ideal but feasible
concept that would be fairer to the poor than the present situation
of open access. This concept is highly beneficial to the world’s
poor although it doesn’t permit developing countries to emit
GHG without constraints in order to reduce severe poverty, as
Shue (2014) and Moellendorf (2014) propose. Under C&C, all
relevant economic systems, including the BRIICS-states, must
start to curb their emission profiles, say, to roughly two tons per
person and year. Moreover, rich nations should assist poor ones
to adapt to climate change via payments into a global adaptation
fund. There should be, of course, forerunners among the rich
states, but eventually all nations (except, perhaps, LDCs) should
be integrated in a robust global mitigation regime.
Prospects for such regime are uncertain after Paris. The
probability to limit global warming within a tolerable window
is dwindling. The hopes for negative emissions (BECCS) shift
the risks to future generations that have to cope with the trade-
offs between biomass production on the one hand, and food
production, freshwater supply, and nature conservation (Bonsch
et al., 2016; Creutzig, 2016). It remains uncertain how close
or far the peak of global emissions might be and whether
there will be a steep decline or a long-lasting high plateau of
emissions. Compliance with the Paris treaty remains shaky. As
we shall see in more detail, SAI-strategies are influential in states
whose representatives refused to join international protocols on
mandatory GHG-reduction or, meanwhile, have declared to step
out of the Paris treaty (section A Critical Look at the U.S., The
Climate Political Performance of the U.S.).
VARIANTS OF CAPITALISM AND
INVESTMENT STRATEGIES
Some Ideas on Political Economy
Political economy, as understood here, is not “pure economics”
as to be found in (“neoclassical”) microeconomic models. “Pure
economics” is about efficient (non-wasteful) allocation of scarce
means of production, aiming at discounted welfare maximization
of rational agents, including societies being modeled as single
(infinite-living) agents (Hodgson, 2001). The axiomatic framing
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is full of normative assumptions that are relevant for economic
policies. Therefore, there are reasons to believe that all economic
theory is, ultimately, political economy (Sen, 1999; Hodgson,
2001; Egan-Krieger, 2014).
The PE perspective adopted in this article stems from
older schools of institutionalism, from macro-economics, and
from historical approaches (Braudel, 1985; Takebayashi, 2003).
Prominent U.S. examples of political economy are Lipson (1960,
esp. chapter 7) and Galbraith (1967). Such approaches address
cultural frames of economics (such as religion), belief systems
(such as “free markets”), significance of economic measures
(such as GDP), concepts of freedom (such as “preference,” see
Hausman, 2012) and consumption, political institutions (such as
property rights), distributive effects of economic activities, tax
systems, welfare state institutions, the role of elites, geopolitical
aspirations, and the like. It doesn’t suppose a unified global
social welfare function but it assumes a globally interconnected
economic system in which single persons take specific roles,
positions, and offices which are more or less powerful and
influential9. Moreover, it assumes the performative efficacy of
economic doctrines by which the mindsets of elites are shaped
(as “rational-choice”-theory and game theory in theories of
action). If economic agents adopt such conceptual approaches as
mindset, they become self-fulfilling prophecies. A PE perspective
takes into account the specificities of economic systems in their
variances, as shaped by law, history, and culture.
Types of Capitalism
The PE argument focusses on technological advanced economic
systems that are in some sense, capitalistic in structure. The
term “capitalism” is used as a descriptive term in order to avoid
all confusions between description and moral evaluation that
are so pervasive in the Marxian school of thought. The term
“capital” refers to stocks that yield flows of benefits. Leaving
general criticism against capitalism aside, I assume that there
are different variants of contemporary capitalism. I roughly
distinguish between the following variants (Max Weber’s “ideal
types,” cf. Mommsen, 1974):
• Neoliberal or “free market” capitalism (as U.S., UK, Australia)
• State-dominated “authoritarian” capitalism (as PRC, GUS)
• Welfare-state capitalism (as Scandinavia, Netherlands)
• Corporatist welfare state capitalism (as Germany, France,
Switzerland, Japan).
• Rent-seeking capitalism (as Greece, Romania, Ukraine,
Nigeria).
The political constitutions of both liberal and (corporatist)
welfare state capitalistic societies entail citizens’ rights and
representative parliamentary democracy. State-dominated
capitalism can come in combination with authoritarian political
regimes, including electorate systems with strong presidencies.
9Since the axiom that all persons maximize their personal utility whatever they do,
is not open for empirical falsification, I do not wish to build any argument on such
axiom (or its derivations). My questions are about specific advantages for specific
groups of people by specific strategies.
If China (PRC) and Russia (GUS) are recognized as post-
communist state-controlled authoritarian capitalistic societies,
all major GHG-emitters are capitalistic societies. The so-called
“dirty dozen” of GHG-emitters resemble variants of capitalism.
The combination of political authoritarianism with economic
liberalism, as we see it in China, can generate high growth rates
in combination with excessive environmental pollution and very
steep increases in GHG-emissions (Economy, 2004). Meanwhile,
just two states emit more than 50% of global CO2: USA and
PCR10.
In historical perspective, the long period of progress and
growth after 1945 was based on cheap energy in all variants
of capitalism (Pfister, 2010). There have been always strong
connections between GHG-emissions, industrial production,
high growth rates of GDP, welfare states, and consumerism. It
is contested whether a transition toward “green” capitalism is,
in principle, possible. Without further debate, such possibility
is affirmed11. Beside deep cultural change, such transition
requires a technological shift by which “old and dirty”
industries would be replaced by smart and clean ones, realizing
Schumpeter’s concepts of creative destruction and innovative
entrepreneurship (Schumpeter, 1942). Creative destruction
within a great transformation to a carbon-low economy, however,
constitutes both winners and losers within different variants
of capitalism and its branches. If so, environmental reform of
capitalism is not in the interest of all capital holders in all variants
of capitalism equally. PE arguments do not lump all capital
holders together, but point at specific interests which might
differently affected by technological innovations and political
transformations. A process of phasing out fossil fuels rapidly
may produce many “mighty losers” whose capital stocks lose
economic value. Divestment strategies may count as example.
Pure efficiency calculations remain silent on how economic
agents will behave in the realm of political economics. PE has to
take specific branches and business models into account.
Energy-intense industries are at risk if environmental
innovations would spread and diffuse around the globe quickly.
This can be explained via Porter-hypothesis. According to Porter-
hypothesis (SRU, 2002), ambitious environmental governance
pays back by long-term export gains if there is global diffusion of
such governance12. Under a global mitigation program, diffusion
of carbon-low technologies would influence patterns of trade.
Given the trade-off between mitigation and SAI, SAI-prospects
may undermine the global diffusion of low-carbon technologies
and related governance schemes. If so, SAI is not neutral with
respect to the diffusion of environmental regulation schemes
(section An EU-Perspective in Contrast).
10Interesting enough, both states have technological traditions of weather
modification and can model SAI as the next step of weather modification. See
Fleming (2010).
11Many eco-Marxist scholars, however, assume the contrary. This debate is beyond
the scope of this article.
12It is doubtful whether integration in a globalized economy implies a “race
to the bottom” or whether “green” welfare states are a kind of an insurance
against the risk of global integration without which economic globalization faces
increasing domestic opposition. Thus, I do not assume that a ‘race to the bottom’
is unavoidable.
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Variants of capitalism with robust welfare-state traditions
and cultures of deliberative democracy generally perform better
in environmental policy-making13 Performance is low in rent-
seeking and authoritarian variants. From the angle of climate
ethics, some sympathy for “greening” welfare-state variants seem
reasonable (see also Münch, 1998).
The Logic of Investment
Capitalistic economies are based on private ownership of
the means of production (stocks of capital) which must be
reinvested. The general spirit of capitalism, however, is the
spirit of investment (Schumpeter, 1942; Weber, [1905]/(2001)).
Investment decisions fix capital for a period of time. They
are framed by a political and legal order and are stimulated
by incentives and by expectations on returns of investments
(“profit”). Investment decisions refer to uncertain expectations
about future markets, future demands, future prices, future
governance schemes, and the like. Thus, they are risky, and
investors usually wish to reduce risks to their capital. To
managers of large capital stocks, loss of capital is to be avoided.
Investments can be made in different technologies in the same
branch (as a shift of investments from fossil fuels to renewable
energies) or they can be shifted across branches (from car
production into wellness tourism, into organic agriculture, or
into biomedicine). Within highly competitive systems, shifts
across different branches are risky since corporations may lack
expertise in these new areas. Even if capitalism, seen at large,
might be a system of creative destruction (Schumpeter, 1942),
single corporations tend to be rather conservative and prefer to
reinvest in their home-branch. There might be “mighty losers,”
fearing both loss of capital value and are risk-averse in shifting to
new branches. Such agents wish to conserve existing structures
and react against change. If SAI spurred new business models
within such sectors, some entrepreneurs will push SAI.
Investment decisions aren’t made in a vacuum but are to
be made under specific boundary conditions. Many investment
decisions must have a close eye on policy making. In any
developed capitalist economy, there are consultations and
negotiations between politicians, administrative bodies, and
representatives of companies holding large stocks of capital.
This is true a fortiori with respect to the energy sector since
investments in energy supply schemes are policy-driven, require
high up-front investments and are long-term oriented. Existing
capital stocks in fossil-fuel based industries amount to trillions
dollars (Chavez, 2014: 8). Aggressive mitigation programs would
reduce the economic value of these capital stocks. Chavez regards
this de-valuation as the real structural barriers against mitigation
policies. If so, under a PE perspective one might expect many
SAI-proponents in all these variants of capitalism, in which fossil
fuel based industries are politically influential.
Present investment decisions are crucial for GHG-emissions
for the coming decades. A global shift away from fossil fuels
to low-carbon renewable energy supply schemes requires large-
scale upfront investments on a global scale. Magnitude of
13See, for example, the “Environmental Performance Index” (EPI) of Yale
University: http://epi.yale.edu/.
upfront-investments in low-carbon industries is roughly about
some dozens billion per year over decades (WBGU, 2011:
153). The (un)likeliness of such investments depends not on
general scarcity of capital but depend on the political will to
channel and nudge investments into low-carbon industries. If
aggressivemitigationwould be the only game in the global village,
investments in the energy supply will shift toward renewables.
This will not guarantee reaching the “well-below-2◦”-target but
it may reach a low-carbon future with more promising prospects
for adaptation. If wealthy states would subsidize renewable
energies domestically, and would give support to international
technology transfers in addition (‘leap frogging’), much capital
could be channeled to new low-carbon industries. Such a
trajectory is still within reach.
If SAI is likely, however, such investments might be
discouraged. This is an implication of the trade-off. Under SAI-
prospects there might be rather conventional investments in
fossil fuels instead (tar sands, fracking, deep sea oil drilling, ocean
floor mining of methane hydrates). In a thought experiment, one
may take the role of a risk-averse holder of capital who wishes
to invest a billion dollar either in renewable energies or in non-
conventional fossil fuels. To such investor, SRM/SAI-prospects
make a difference in prospects about returns of investment. If a
rational investor believes that there is a self-stabilizing “fitting”-
relation between BAU of an economic system and SAI, and if she
rationally believes that BAU-lobbies have far more influence on
policy-makers than newcomers, and if, moreover, her mindset
is supportive to the system as it runs, she has economic reasons
to invest in non-conventional and/or conventional fossil fuels. If
most investment decisions are made according to such reasons,
capital stocks remain within fossil fuel based branches and
related industries. Some investments will flow directly into SAI-
related industries. One should not extrapolate the findings in
experimental economics to investment decisions: Even if lay
persons in controlled economic survey show a negative trade-
off (Merk et al., 2015, 2016) it doesn’t follow that investors will
behave accordingly. They might try to create an influence on
politics in order to keep the status quo or support politicians who
campaign in favor of fossil fuels. This is a crucial point: If persons
prefer mitigation over SAI in discursive and participatory settings
(Bellamy et al., 2016), it doesn’t follow that policy makers and
economic elites will decide accordingly.
Given this, PE arguments should be observant of specific
variants of capitalism. In any case, such PE arguments should be
able to explain why some variants of capitalism might be more
prone to SAI-trajectories than others are14. In the next section, I
focus exclusively on the U.S.
A CRITICAL LOOK AT THE U.S.
It seems fair to argue that the new debate on SAI has emerged
in the U.S. after Crutzen’s initial paper (Crutzen, 2006). It seems
also fair to say that the U.S. is to blame for their non-cooperative
14I differ from Gunderson et al. (2018) in this respect. There is no single entity as
“the” capitalism, but there are highly different varieties. Such varieties can make
huge differences in environmental performance and mitigation policies.
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behavior in international climate policy-making since the Rio
summit (Shue, 2014). The U.S. has clearly failed in domestic
mitigation, since it has increased its emissions since 1990. The
U.S. variant of liberal market capitalism is based on high energy
input, old Fordist industries, overheated consumerism with high
indebtedness, fixation on high GDP-growth-rates, deregulation
of financial markets, high inequality, high violent criminal rates,
high budget deficits, “rust belts,” and large military-industrial
complexes. Aggressive mitigation is opposed by many influential
actors within the U.S. political-economic system, including mass
media (Kearnes, 2007). The reasons against mitigation are often
backed by climate skepticism in the past (Oreskes and Conway,
2011)15, but have recently shifted to SAI (Sikka, 2012). Some
remarks on the Trump administration and on recent political
developments are added to this picture in section The Trump
US-Administration and SAI.
The Climate Political Performance of the
U.S.
The GHG-emissions have increased in the U.S. roughly 18%
since 1990. They are on average roughly 21 tons per person
and year. CO2 emissions were 4.8 billion tons in 1990 and
5.333 billion tons in 201116. Even the most progressive current
mitigation strategies do not reach the former Kyoto targets.
Many energy investments have turned to Canadian tar sands,
offshore oil drilling, and fracking. Exploration for new oil fields
and geostrategic securitization of strategic supply continue. The
emissions have decreased in recent years due to a shift to
unconventional fossil fuels (“fracking”). This shift, however, adds
a new mining activity and it does not exclude a return to
conventional fossil fuels as soon as the fracking-boom will be
over. This recent shift as such does not establish a structural
transition to a low-carbon economy.
Despite many laudable activities in some federal states and
towns, the U.S. has no strategic blueprint for a transition to
low GHG-emission-profiles. Perhaps, the U.S. have missed their
window of opportunity to start mitigating emissions in the 1990’s
and have gridlocked themselves in a situation that forces them
to go for SRM/SAI. This picture would be in line with the
“tragic” and “adverse” position (section Introduction: Outlook on
Structure and Content of the Argument). The U.S. contributes to
make the very premise true on which many SRM/SAI advocates
argue: Mitigation won’t be sufficient.
Carter’s Explanatory Scheme
In this subsection I wish to test the hypothesis that the U.S.-
system has run into a specific “hazardous” trajectory since
15According to the documents in Anderson et al. (2017), the energy industries
knew about the “greenhouse” effect since the 1970ies. The push for nuclear energy
was justified by leading proponents, as Chauncey Starr and Merril Eisenbud, via
concerns about climate change effects by burning coal.
16See http://cait2.wri.org/profile/United%20States. According to Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) (2018), overall US GHG-emissions have increased from
6.356 million metric tons CO2-eqivalents in 1990 up to 7.351 million metric tons
in 2007. They decreased to 6.511 million metric tons in 2016 due to substitution
from coal to gas and to warmer winter conditions. The open question is whether
the decrease is the beginning of a long downward trend or just an intermezzo.
decades which makes it akin to SAI. Such dynamic trajectories
have been schematized by political philosopher Carter (1993,
2004). Carter distinguishes beneficial (pacifistic, egalitarian,
democratic, and “green” technology) from hazardous dynamics.
One of the many premises in the PE argument is Carter’s
assumption that there is a reinforcing and mutually stabilizing
dynamics on both the beneficial and the hazardous trajectory.
There can be political shifts from one dynamics to the other
but such shifts require strong political movements, an electorate
system that does not block new parties, and a shift in cultural
hegemony of ideas. Carter’s scheme is clearly both value-laden
and explanatory. The positive and negative values within Carter’s
scheme are shared by environmentalists and by persons favoring
strong sustainability, deliberative democracy, a robust welfare
state, and limited inequality17. The explanatory force of the
scheme, however, must hold irrespectively whether these values
are shared or not. In principle, even supporters of both SAI and
the U.S. (“enthusiasts”) might agree that there are some structural
affinities between SAI and the U.S. variant of capitalism. By
hypothesis, the U.S. are taken as an instance of Carter’s scheme
(see Figure 2).
Let’s briefly look at each point in turn (see Figure 2): The
military budget of the U.S. is the highest world-wide and
has sharply increased since 2003 up to 711 billion dollars in
2011 (4.8% of GNP in 2010). The military-industrial complex,
including electronic surveillance, borderline control and home
defense, is strongly influential. Many brokers move between
the political system and this complex, lobbying against cuts in
military expenditures. This complex would clearly benefit from
SAI18. Nationalistic forces, such as the Tea Party movement, the
National Rifle Association and Christian movements within the
Bible Belt create political influences, especially on the Republican
Party. If SAI would presumably serve U.S. interests, Trump’s
“America first” politics should be supportive to this technology.
The GINI-coefficient is higher in the U.S. than in all other
industrialized states. According to Milanovic (2016, p. 71–74),
income GINI increased since 1979 after some period of decline
after Second World War. Wealth GINI has increased from 0.45
in 2007 up to 0.477 in 2011. Current inequality comes close to
rates at the beginning of twentieth century (Bourguignon, 2012).
Inequality has increased to kinds of high-end-excessiveness of
a tiny minority. There is a squeezing of the middle class in
the U.S. creating fears and anxieties since there are far less
welfare state securities. There are widespread resentments against
immigration (Cafaro, 2015).
There are severe concerns about democratic culture. Wolin
(2008) has described the political system in the U.S. as “managed
democracy.” The political debate on climate change is a paradigm
case for such management as it has been distorted by interest
17It is clearly beyond the scope of this article to justify these concepts ethically. See,
for overview, Ott (2014) with respect to strong sustainability, and Ott (2012b) with
respect to Habermasian deliberative democracy. Welfare state justifications might
be found, among others, in Rawls (1971) and Cohen (1989).
18Cairns (2014) points at the “dual use” character of SAI. To Cairns, it is highly
likely that military bodies might carry out SAI. The prospects and pitfalls of a
securitization framing are outlined in Engelke and Chiu (2016).
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FIGURE 2 | Carter’s scheme of hazardous dynamics. Figure adopted from Carter (2004), p. 316 with kind permission of White Horse Press.
groups. If one gives credit to Wolin’s analysis, democracy in the
U.S. is in a critical state in many respects19.
Given that the U.S. variant of capitalism well resembles three
out of four poles of Carter’s scheme (Figure 2), given further
the arrows that point toward the pole of technologies, and given
the cultural trust in engineering solutions, SAI fits coherently
in the fourth field of the scheme. This is to say, that the strong
support that SAI finds in the U.S. (see section Agency Networks
and Narratives in the U.S.) does not come as a surprise under
Carter’s perspective. This result supports the “fitting”-hypothesis
(section Introduction: Outlook on Structure and Content of the
Argument)20. Gunderson et al. (2018) come to the same result:
SAI makes sense in a political structure that is unable to reduce
emissions drastically, believes in “cheap fixes and easy ways
out,” and can incorporate business models that profit from RDD
on SRM/SAI.
19The reader shall feel free to add some evidence from the Trump administration
to Wolin’s picture.
20The argument as given so far only allows for stating affinities and correlations
rather than causes. To establish a strong causal nexus would require far more
studies in the field of the economies in the U.S. At themoment, it must be sufficient
to state affinities (“fittings”) and to entertain the hypothesis that there might be a
nexus. Such hypothesis shouldn’t be confused with conspiracy speculations.
This preliminary result ignites the question whether the U.S.
are a trustworthy country to launch large SAI-research programs.
This question does not deny the individual liberty right of
scientists to do research, but point at how such “big science”
programs might be embedded in the overall structures of the U.S.
economy.
AGENCY NETWORKS AND NARRATIVES
IN THE U.S
Between Argumentation and Ideology
Ethical analysis of climate-engineering discourse has to reflect
presuppositions and consequences of all pro- and con-arguments
being made in the field. Such analysis takes arguments at face
value and organizes them into maps (Betz and Cacean, 2012).
It takes presumptions of moral argumentation seriously. Ethical
analysis supposes that arguments are given and taken with a
discursive attitude. This general attitude constitutes a common
quest for soundness and substance of arguments. Ethical analysis
(“reconstruction”) distinguishes between a context of discovery
and a context of justification. Contexts of discovery with all their
accidental features have to be abstracted away as an argument is
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to be reconstructed according to its structure (premises, logic of
inference, credibility of single assumptions).
These discourse-ethical presumptions seem naïve and highly
idealistic in the field of politics. Within PE, a step from discourse
ethics into critical discourse analysis seems necessary. From the
perspective of discourse analysis, the concept of discourse refers
to persuasive strategies embedded in power structures (Sikka,
2012, 2013). Such studies point at specific contexts of origins,
framings, organizations, vested interests, the rhetoric of hidden
agendas, science-policy-interfaces and the like21.
Networks and Narratives
Discourse analysis refers to agency-networks and to their
narratives and frames (Grüne-Yanoff, 2016). If there is a pro-SAI
agency-network emerging in neoliberal variants of capitalism,
many of its members should hold high offices and should be
actively engaged in it as professionals. We should expect those
people in the military, aviation, and space-flights industries, in all
industries based on fossil fuels, in conservative, and libertarian
think tanks, in right-wing forces of the Republican Party and
in some epistemic communities22 being involved in related
research programs. Recent studies confirm this hypothesis (Sikka,
2012, 2013). One can register the emergence of a pro-SAI-
agency network in recent years. Leading proponents are some
epistemic communities (such as the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency), several think tanks (as American Enterprise
Institute and the Climate Response Fund), donors (such as Bill
Gates and Richard Branson), corporations (such as the Aurora
Flight Science Corporation), andmanymedia agents.Meanwhile,
there are debates how patent law could cope with the grab
for broad patents on climate-engineering technologies (Geopool
proposal, see Chavez, 2014). Huttunen et al. (2015, p. 16) present
evidence from many documents that “numerous conservative,
climate-skeptic think tanks and lobbyists” launch SRM/SAI-
friendly reports for political and public audiences. According to
Huttunen et al. (2015, p. 27), “hopes and permissive attitudes
were more pronounced in the USA than elsewhere.” Gunderson
et al. (2018) point at the language of “techno-glorification” being
used, especially on medical metaphors.
All members of this agency network propose to enlarge
and intensify SAI-research. Meanwhile, David Keith is going
to launch a small-scale field experiment on SAI in Arizona
in 201823. The field experiment has been announced in 2014
(Dykema et al., 2014). The rationale is to be found in Keith
(2013). Keith, as his writings and talks clearly indicate, belongs
to the cautious camp of SAI-supporters. Cautious proponents, as
Keith, concede that the steps between modeling and laboratory
research and full deployment should be governed by risk-
awareness and prudence. Jamieson (2014, p. 226), however,
points at the political logic of large research initiatives: “They fed
21By doing so, such studies touch the problem of ‘ideology’ which is beyond the
scope of this article.
22Hamilton (2014) takes a closer look on Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory.
23Keith rightly distinguishes between field “experiments” and field “tests.” Large
tests come close to deployment. The line between field experiments and field tests
is fuzzy.
fortunes, careers, and reputations. As with the Strategic Defense
Initiative, a dedicated geoengineering research program risks a
self-amplifying cycle of interest groups and lobbies, building
momentum toward eventual deployment as a way of justifying
the research.” If there are large research programs without
deployment, some members of the SAI-network might see the
research money as sunk costs.
Agency-networks cohere because members share common
interests, values, commitments, mindsets, and attitudes. Agency
networks are not only constituted by interests but also by beliefs,
moral visions and guiding images (“Leitbilder”) which form an
affirmative narrative on matters at hand24. All agency networks
long for a credible narrative of goodness, and so does SAI. SAI-
proponents borrow from NGO’s and the IPCC’s reports (IPCC,
2013)most dramatic warnings against the impacts of unmitigated
climate change. It is argued that mitigation strategies are bound
to fail despite Paris. This prediction is often backed by game-
theoretical and neo-realistic approaches within the theory of
international relations. Sikka (2012, 2013) mentions additional
components of this narrative: (a) belief in scientifically based
technological solutions (“big science”), (b) belief inmarket-based,
efficient solutions, (c) significance of high growth rates of GDP,
(d) construction of an emergency situation which allows for
uncommon measures, and (e) a cultural tradition of “fixing the
sky” (Fleming, 2010). Some SAI-proponents reject mitigation
because “emission reductions do not provide direct control over
temperature” (Bickel, quoted in Sikka, 2012: 170). More recently,
moral elements have been incorporated into this narrative.
Ethical pro-arguments and the elements of this narrative have
large overlap. Jason Blakstock proposes to base SAI-deployment
on the obligation to help poor groups in the Global South deal
with impacts of unmitigated climate change (as heat waves,
extreme events, droughts, and the spread of malaria). At the
edge of the narrative, there are positive external effects of SAI
being mentioned, as protecting children from sunburn and a
reduction of skin cancer. It is easy to claim that SRM/SAI is a
tragic predicament in the Anthropocene.
THE TRUMP US-ADMINISTRATION
AND SAI
This PE perspective seems not confirmed by the politics of the
Trump administration25. Given the “fitting”-relation (section A
Critical Look at the U.S.), it looks somewhat paradoxical, that
the emerging pro-SAI network still remains in some distance
from the Trump administration. Donald Trump himself has
been deeply influenced by climate skepticism. This is true for
Scott Pruitt, too, who has been appointed chief of Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA). As long as Trump denies the very
existence of climate change (“Chinese hoax”), he clearly doesn’t
have to consider SAI as an option to combat its impacts. Former
24The “fixing the sky”-tradition may serve well as a background tradition. See
Fleming (2010).
25In June 2017, Trump declared that the US would withdraw from the Paris
agreement. There is a clear convergence between the interests of the fossil-fuel
industries and many of Trump’s voters, especially in the “rust belt.”
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Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, former Exxon CEO, however,
stated that climate change is “an engineering problem, and it
has engineering solutions” (Tillerson in: Mooney, 2016). This
statement refers to conventional means of adaptation (as flood
walls), but it can easily be enlarged to SAI. Meanwhile, the
“Committee on Science, Space, & Technology” has had a hearing
on climate engineering in 2017. In this hearing, scientist Douglas
MacMartin argued for aggressive research projects which might
identify the best options within 10 years and “have something”
for deployment a decade later.
After this meeting, Lamar Smith launched a brief paper on
climate engineering (Smith, 2017). Smith says, geoengineering
“could become a tool” to curb the impacts on climate change.
Smith mentions cloud brightening technologies as well as
SAI. To Smith, SRM is an “intriguing idea.” “Instead of
forcing unworkable and costly government mandates on the
American people, we should look to technology and innovation.
(...) Geoengineering should be considered when discussing
technological advances to protect the environment” (Smith,
2017). End of January 2018, Smith launched a more elaborated
paper (Smith, 2018). One should take Smith seriously as a
politically influential proponent of an enthusiastic position (as
defined in section Introduction: Outlook on Structure and
Content of the Argument), wishing to spur SRM/SAI on its
way onto RDD. Some quotations may suffice to justify this
judgement. Smith (2018) states: “Another area of research
that has been overlooked for too long is geoengineering. This
concept involves using technology to make positive changes
in our atmosphere. While this subject is at the basic research
phase, many concepts are groundbreaking and warrant further
investigation. One such area of research is SRM, which involves
slightly altering the amount of sunlight that penetrates and
warms the earth.” This rhetoric suggests that sunlight itself is
an environmental problem since it “penetrates” the earth. SAI,
then, could prevent the planet from such penetration by sunlight.
Smith augments his way of looking at things by enthusiasm about
the nexus between scientific research and private enterprise.
Smith (2018): “By focusing our resources on basic research, we
can find solutions that meet our needs. America is home to
some of the best scientists and greatest scientific facilities in
the world. Supporting our scientists with adequate resources for
technology innovation will unlock ideas and concepts that can
be employed by private industry.” Smith contrasts technological
innovation with “burdensome regulations” in a way that rises
concern about a tradeoff between SAI and mitigation. Smith
finalizes his statement as follows: “As in the past, by letting
technology lead the way, Americans will reap the benefits and
enjoy a better quality of life.” Thus, the crucial messages from
the geoengineering-network have meanwhile reached congress.
Until now, Trump himself has remained silent on SAI. If denial of
climate change can’t be continued, and if Trump might become
aware of SAI via Smith or other persons in the administration,
he might see SAI as perfect opportunity to combine “America
first!,” fossil fuel reinforcement, GDP-growth, “big-science”-
enthusiasm, opportunities for private enterprise, support for
the military-industrial complex, and support of his voters by
launching SAI- research initiatives. In a lecture at EM-Tech-MIT
conference in November 2017, David Keith expresses his fear that
the very idea of SAI technology might be “exploited by those
who wish to block emission.” Keith’s nightmare is a Trump tweet
(Orcutt, 2017). As it seems, the cautious option to keep temporal
SAI in the portfolio of means to reach a 1.5◦-target (MacMartin
et al., 2018) must be reconciled with the rather enthusiastic
perspectives that may take SAI as a substitute for mitigation, as
soon as SAI-initiatives are launched. Such predictable tensions at
the science-policy-interface constitute highmoral responsibilities
for scientists being involved.
An EU-Perspective in Contrast
It is beyond the scope of this article to analyze all variants of
capitalism (section The Logic of Investment) with respect to
SRM and SAI. Special attention should be devoted to China
(Moore et al., 2016), because China has some tradition in weather
modification (Xueliang, 2009) and wishes to keep constant or
even increase agricultural yields even in times of climate change.
In this article, I focus on the EU, especially on Germany and
France26. For a comparative analysis of official documents in
different countries, see Huttunen et al. (2015).
How, one may ask, might European variants of capitalism
that undertook first steps toward “greening” the economy, are
willing to phase out coal stepwise, and are investing in renewable
energies be affected by presumptive large SAI research programs?
SAI strategies that fit into one specific variant of capitalism may
not necessarily benefit other variants. They might be detrimental
to reforms. It is highly questionable whether SRM/SAI initiatives
in the U.S. are in the interests of EU countries. How would, for
instance, the effectiveness of photovoltaic solar energy be affected
by SAI?
As Martin Jänicke has argued in his many publications (see
Jänicke, 2013), there are emerging lead-markets within greening
welfare state variants of capitalism. Lead-markets can be pushed
forward by setting environmental standards high, regulating
production by means of law, and subsidizing renewable energies
for some time. Although the environmental performance of
welfare state capitalism is far from perfect and GHG-emission
are still far too high (roughly nine tons per person and year
in Germany), there are some environmental success stories.
Meanwhile, mainstreaming renewable energy supply schemes,
smart technologies, and low-carbon lifestyles are on the EU-
agenda27. With respect to long-term investments in the energy
system, some countries have found a societal agreement to
shift electricity production to renewables. Despite some recent
tendencies to stagnation, the German “Energiewende” can be
seen as a paradigm case for such transformation (Baatz and
Ott, 2016). Replacement of nuclear and coal burning facilities
by renewable energies implies huge upfront investments in
wind and solar power facilities, enlarged grids, regulation of
biomass production, and enhanced energy storage. There must
be energy-saving investments into buildings, infrastructure, and
26See for France Ministère de la Transition Ecologique et Solidaire (2017).
27The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) is not an economic law but it can
be made true by political practices. Thus, EKC is a prescriptive rather than a
descriptive model.
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transport systems. Such upfront-investments in a low-carbon
society make economic sense only if costs of fossil fuels increase
over time. If societies would return to fossil fuels those upfront
investments would be at risk. Thus, SAI affects the economic
value of capital stocks unevenly. If Carter’s scheme is enriched
with recent debates about rebound-effects (Chitnis et al., 2013),
SAI can be seen as constituting both a technological macro-
rebound with respect to limited natural sink capacities and
an economic defense strategy against structural change. SAI
is aggressive against investments in carbon-low technologies.
Macro-rebounds intentionally stretch natural boundaries and
cultural limits in order to make a system run longer than it
otherwise would be able to28. Such rebounds are a kind of
protectionist measures. Given this, RDD on SAI should be
seen as a presumptive aggressive protectionist macro-rebound
against change. Therefore, “greening” variants of capitalism have
prudential macro-economic reasons to oppose SAI initiatives.
This prudential economic perspective might be enriched with
moral principles of climate ethics (section On Climate Ethics).
It might be also enriched with skepticism against “arming-the-
future”-, “emergency”-, and even “buying-time”-arguments and
against cost estimates of SAI (section On Climate Ethics). If so,
prudential economic reasons, climate ethical reasons and specific
anti-SAI-reasons are reasons to reject the enthusiastic perspective
as adopted by Smith (section The Trump US-Administration
and SAI).
CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
There are some results in both kinds of analysis: In section A
Critical Look at the U.S., we identified the U.S. economic system
as a variant of capitalism that has strong structural affinities
to SAI (see also Gunderson et al., 2018). With help of Carter’s
scheme, we can propose a plausible “fitting”-judgment for further
debate. In section Agency Networks and Narratives in the U.S.,
we identified an emerging agency network within this variant that
is devoted to R&D of SAI and that tries to establish a specific pro-
SAI narrative. Recent development (Smith, 2017, 2018) provides
strong evidence that this narrative has now reached the realm of
policy making. The demon is out of the bottle.
Given the results (section Variants of Capitalism and
Investment Strategies, A Critical Look at the U.S., and
Agency Networks and Narratives in the U.S.), the problem of
trustworthiness pops up again. Shall we trust in decency, scrutiny,
and prudence of leading agents if the U.S. would launch a large
SAI-initiative? Is this variant of capitalism, inclusive its SAI-
network, in a moral position to take further steps on a RDD-
route which points at large field tests and, finally, deployment?
In principle, this is an open question. Given the climate ethical
premises (section On Climate Ethics) and the fitting-judgement,
it isn’t. Since (a) the U.S. do not curb their emissions sufficiently,
since (b) the U.S. blocks progress in international climate
negotiation (and may leave the Paris treaty), since (c) the new
28Large-scale–land-acquisitions might be another example for macro-rebounds to
counter land degradation. The idea that SAI can be viewed as a macro-rebound
originally belongs to Barbara Muraca (oral communication).
presidency refuses to pay into a global adaptation funding facility,
since (d) some political leaders deny climate change against
all scientific evidence, since (e) ruling elites may take SAI as
substitute for mitigation as well as rebound against economic
change, this country is, seen as a matter of principle, not in a
moral position to launch large SAI research initiatives. While PE
perspective explains why SAI fits into this variant of capitalism,
climate ethical perspective looks upon such prospects reluctantly.
What can one do? There are multiple strategies against
SRM/SAI-programs in the U.S. Out of this multitude of strategies
I mention only two.
The first strategy would give support for the camp of
cautious scientists within the U.S. system of research. I see
David Keith, Douglas MacMartin, and Ken Caldeira as high-
rank members of the cautious camp. Members of this camp
have often argued that the only responsible SAI-strategy would
look like this MacMartin et al. (2018): In principle, SAI should
not be taken as substitute for mitigation, but should be strictly
supplementary to mitigation being the first-best strategy. The
only acceptable SAI-option is temporal peak-shaving within a
long-term global mitigation strategy to combat middle-term
adverse effects of climate change. Such peak-shaving deployment
should be intensively and open-ended researched with respect
to side effects (acid rain, precipitation patterns, ozone layer
etc.)29. There must be a clearly defined and robust termination
strategy. Such research process should be monitored by a board
of international scientists. This strategy assumes, in principle,
a deep distrust against SAI-initiatives in the U.S., but it also
assumes a camp of cautious scientists whose members are willing
and capable to adopt the role of concerned and responsible
scientists.
The second strategy is a global political one. According
to Huttunen et al. (2015, p. 28), official policy development
on SRM/SAI is “still in an early stage, focusing on exploring
the topic.” If Huttunen et al. (2015) are correct on this
ongoing “cautious exploratory phase,” most governments are
open-minded or even critical about SRM/SAI prospects.
Many international organizations support a skeptical attitude
against SRM/SAI. If there is any agreement at all in the
climate engineering discourse, there is the agreement that SAI
deployment would be unnecessary if mitigation efforts could
keep the increase of global mean temperature within the tolerable
window of “well below 2◦C.” In such moments of political
exploration and under the general agreement just mentioned,
a well-organized, campaigning global civil society could create
a domestic influence on national governments to intensify
mitigation efforts in order to avoid SAI. Many studies indicate
that a “negative tradeoff” is widespread within civil society.When
ordinary lay people are informed about SRM/SAI prospects, they
prefer intensified mitigation efforts instead. This more intuitive
and personal negative trade-off can be backed by climate ethics
(section On Climate Ethics) and it should be politicized in
the global arena. If governments would commit themselves via
intended national contributions under the Paris regime to such
29A similar position has been substantiated from an economic perspective by
Quaas et al. (2017). Quaas et al. (2017) suppose an “arming the future”-argument.
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intensified mitigation efforts, SAI might become unnecessary.
It would take another article to elaborate this strategy in more
detail.
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